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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY a
corporntion as Trus,tee, and PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATrON, a 'corporation,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
PAYLESS BUILDERS SUPPLY, a
Utah corporation, ELLIS J. ROBINSON and ELIZA S. ROBINSON,
his wife,
Defendants and Appellants,
:\IOUNT OLYMPUS COVE, a Utah
corporation; BREITLING BROS.
CONSTRUCTION CO., a corporation; SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, a corporation; UTAH SAND &
GRAVEL PRODUCTS CORPORATION, a corporation; MAX G.
FRAMPTON and MARYL. FRAMPTON, his wife; MURRAY STATE
BANK, a co1·poration; R. W. FRANK
& CO., a corpora:tion; UNITED
STATES OF .AIMERJICA; WILLIAM
R. WALLA CE, dba RUSS WALLA CE ROOFING COMP ANY,
Defendants and Respondents.

CASE No.
10269

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondents Security Title Company and
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association submit the following statement of facts in supplement
1

to those set out in Appellants' b1·ief. The Respondent Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association, a corporation, will be referred to in this brief
as Respondents, 01· Prudential, and Respondent
Security Title Company will be referred to as Re~ondents, 01· Security. The Appellants Pay Less
Builders Supply, a co1·p01·ation, and Ellis J. Robinson and Eliza S. Robinson, his wife, will be referred
to as Appellants, or Pay Less Builders Supply, and
Ellis J. Robinson and Eliza S. Robinson respectively.
The facts of this case a1·e set forth in Respondent's complaint, Appellants' motion to dismiss and
answer, the answers, counterclaims and cross-claims
of the other defendants in the action, pre-trial order,
transcript, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Dec1·ee of Foreclosure, togethe1· with order of
sale, and the return of sale by the Sheriff of Salt
Lake County.
On June 25, 1962, Respondent Prudential made
a loan to Appellants in the sum of $27,500.00 (R.6,
74 Ex. P. 2) To evidence said loan on June 25, 1962
all Appellants made, executed and delivered to Respondent Prudential a promissory note for the sum
of $27,500.00, a true copy of which is attached to
Respondent's complaint. (R. 6, 74 Ex. P. 2) The
note provides fo1· the payment of interest at the
rate of 6~~ per annum on the unpaid balance
until paid, and principal and interest to be paid
in monthly installments of $232.07 each, commenc-

ing ~n. June 1, 1963. The note contains the following
prOVlSlOnS:
'.'If default be made in the payment of
any mstallment required by this note, or in
the performa?ce of any .covenant or promise
of the undersigned con tamed in the trust deed
s~curing the payment hereof, the entire principal sum and accrued interest shall at once
b_ecome due, payable an~ collectible at the opt10n of the holder of this note without notice
to the undersigned or their successors in intei·est. Failure to exercise this option shall not
constitute a waiver to exercise the same in the
event of a subsequent default or defaults.
This note, or any payment thereimder,
ni:r !J be e:etended from time to time without in
an .IJ way affecting or impairing the liability
of tlir> makers 01· endorsers thereof.
... in the event Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association and the Trustee
uncler deed of trust given to secure the payment hereof or ei the1· of them shall ( 1) determine to foreclose said deed of trust by court
action, 01· ( 2) find it necessary to resort to
the courts to secure protection of the security
described in said deed of trust or to enforce
01· protect the rights of Prudential Federal
SavinP·s and Loan Association hereunder or
under"' said deed of trust, or ( 3) be involved
in com"t action involving or affecting said deed
of trust, the security given thereunder, or the
indebtedness secured thereby, the Trustor
agrees to pay all costs and expens~s incurred
therein and reasonable compensation for the
attorneys representing .P1yden ti al Federal
Savings and Loan Association and the Trustee, or erthe1· of them.
3

This note is secured by a real estate deed
of trust and is given in consideration of a
loan by the payee hereof to the undersigned."
(R. 6, 74 P. Ex. 2)
The original promissory note iv.as identified, offered
and accepted into evidence by the trial cow·t at pretrial iuithout exception by counsel for appellants.
(R. 6, 74 Ex. P. 2).

On the same date, June 25, 1962, to secure payment of the promissory note 'and for the benefit of
Respondent Prudential as Beneficiary, Appellant
Pay Less Builders Supply executed and delivered to
Respondent, Security as Trustee, a deed of trust for
the sum of $27,500.00, a true copy of which is attached to Respondents' complaint. (R. 7-8, 74 P. Ex.
1) Said deed of trust was duly acknowledged and
certified so as to be entitled to record, and was recorded on June 27, 1962 in Book 1937, page 174,
records of the Salt Lake County Recorder, State of
Utah, and when recorded became a good and sufficient paramount first lien upon the premises situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, consisting
of a house and lot described as follows:
Lot 15, MT. OLYMPUS COVE, according
to the plat thereof, recorded in the office of
the County Recorder of said County.
The original deed of trust was identified, offered
and accepted by the trial court at pretrial, again
withont protest from counsel for Appellants. (R. 74,
4

Ex. P. 1), The deed of trust provides among other
things:
"A. To protect the security of this Deed of
Trust, Trustor agrees:
. l. To k~ep said property in good condition and repair; ... not to commit or permit
waste thereon ; . . .
3. To appear in and defend any action
or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and to pay all costs and
expenses, including cost of evidence of title
and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum, in
any action or proceeding in which Beneficiary
or Trustee may appear.
4. To pay before delinquent all taxes
and assessments affecting said property; and
all encumbrances, charges and liens, with interest and penalties, on said property or any
part thereof, which appear to be or are prior
or superior hereto.
In addition to the monthly payments as
provided in said note, the Trustor agrees to
pay to the Beneficiary, upon the same day e·ach
month, budget payments estimated to equal
one-twelfth of the annual taxes and insurance
premiums; ...
7. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or do any act herein pr?vided, th~n B,~n
eficiary or Trustee, but without dbhgation
so to do and without notice to or demand upon
Trustor and without releasing Trustor from
any obligation hereof, may: make or do the
same in such manner and to such extent as
5

eitha 'may deern necessary to protect the security he1·eof, Beneficiary 01· Trustee being
authorized to enter upon said property for
such purposes; appear in and defend any ·ac-

tion or proceeding purporting to affect the
security hereof or the right or power of Beneficiary or Trustee; ... and, in e-:rercising any
such pmvers, 01· in enforcing this Deed of Trust
by judicial foreclos11re, pay necessary expenses, employ counsel and pay his reasonable fees.

B.

It is mutually agreed that:

5. As additional security, Trustor hereby gives to and confers upon Beneficiary the
right, pml'er and anthority, clnring the continnance of these Tn1sts, to collect the rents,
issues anc{ prnfits of said propaty, reserving
unto Tn1stor the right p1·ior to any default by
Trustor in payment of any indebtedness securecl hereby or in performance of any agreement hereunder, to collect and retain such
rents, issues and profits as they become due
and payable . . .
13. In the event the Beneficiary and the
Trustee or either of them shall (a) determine
to foreclose this Deed of Trust by court action,
or ( b) find it necessary 'to resort to the courts
to secure protection of the security given hereunde1· or to enforce or protect the rights hereunder of the Beneficiary, the TnlStor agrees
to pay all costs and expenses incurred therein and reasonable compensations for the attorneys representing the Beneficiary and the
Trustee, or either of them."
Appellants failed to pay the p1·incipal and interest payments of $232.07 per month which became
6

due under said promissory note for the months of
June through December 1963, and the month of
January, 1964, when this action was commenced.
Appellants also failed, refused and neglected to pay
for each of said months the further amount of $46.93
per month, the amount required to be paid under said
deed of trust for taxes, fire and other hazard insurance premiums. (R. 2, 77, 130). In fact, Appellants

have never made any payments on said promissory
note or deed of trust for princi'fXll, interest, taxes
cincl ffre insurance premiums since June, 1963, when
said payments were to commence. (R. 77, 130). By

reason of such defaults, Respondents elected to declare the unpaid balance of said note and deed of
trust clue and payable, and elected to foreclose said
cleecl of ti·ust in the manner provided by law for the
foreclosm·e of mm·tgages on real property, as permi ttecl by Sec. 57-1-23, U.C.A. 1953 as amended.
At the time this foreclosure action was commenced the Preliminary Title Report, which was
identified, offered and accepted by the Com~t at Pretrial as Respondents Exhibit 3 (R. 74, P. Ex. 3)
·without exce~)tion by counsel for Appellants showed
the above presmises, in addition to Respondent's
deed of trust loan, was encumbered by numerous
liens, including a Federal tax lien, claimed by defendants amounting to a total sum of $31,548.86.
Defendants who claimed liens prior to the lien
7

of Respondent's deed of trust included the followmg:
United States of America, Federal
tax lien (R. 33-34, 79, 74 P. Ex. 3) $5,075.04
William R. Wallace, dba Russ Wallace Roofing Co., Judgment lien
(R. 15-16, 81, 7 4, P. Ex. 3) ____________ 1,389.50
R. W. Frank and Co., Judgment
Lien (R. 13-14, 82, 74, P. Ex. 3)____ 9,031.73
MmTay State Bank, Judgment Lien
(R. 10-11, 74, P. Ex. 3) ________________ 3,087.50
Utah Sand and G1·avel, Judgment
Lien (R. 9, 81-82, 74, P. Ex. 3) ________

658.42

Breitling Bros. Construction Co.,
mortgage lien, ( R. 18-22, 80, 7 4
P. Ex. 3) --------------------------------------

855.00

Other defendants who claimed liens on the said
premises without claiming their liens were prior to
the Respondent's deed of trust are as follows:
Mt. Olympus Cove, mortgage lien
(R. 28-32, 79, 74, P. Ex. 3) ____________ $6,000.00
Mt. Olympus Cove, mortgage lien
(R. 28-32, 80, 7 4, P. Ex. 3) __________
Max G. Frampton and Mary L.
Frampton, Judgment Lien (R. 74,
P. Ex. 3) -----------------------------------------Security Title Company as Assignee of judgment in favor of Pioneer vVholesale Supply Co. (R. 74,
P. Ex. 3) ----------------------------------------

2,400.00
838.32

2,213.35

TotaL ______________ $31,548.86
8

Appellants in their Sixth Defense of their answer claimed the tax lien of the United States of
America was prior to Respondent's deed of trust
lien insofar as it secured payment of Respondents'
attorney's fees and costs. (R. 27)
On February 10, 1964, Appellants filed a motion in the District Court of Salt Lake County to dismiss Respondents' complaint because of Respondents' failure to follow statutory remedies provided
by the Utah Code. This motion was properly noticed
fo1· hearing by Responclen ts before Third District
Judge Aldon J. Anderson on February 25, 1964, and
was denied on the same date. (R. 12, 17, 18).
On June 29, 1964, Respondents filed their Notice of Readiness for Trial. ( R. 73). Third District
J uclge Stewart M. Hanson set the case for pretrial
on July 8, 1964. ( R. 73). On July 8, 1964, the pretrial hea1·ing was continued by Judge Hanson, upon
the oral motion of John Elwood Dennett, attorney
fo1· Appellants, over the objections of Respondents
and the other defendants' attorneys, in order to give
Appellants a reasonable time to amend their answer
and to file a third-party claim and counterclaim:
"on the proposition that the plaintiff has illegally entered into the premises and purportedly sold the same under a conditional sales contract without knowledge and consent of ~he
defendants, or any of them; that the pla!ntiffs collected payments in rents f?r which
they have failed to ac~ount; and a third-par,ty
claim and counterclaim on the grounds that
9

t~1e prnpel'ty was advantageously sold, ten tatn-ely sold, ancl that the sale failed because
of malicious interfe1·ence of the plaintiff Pru~1ential, in t~e proposed ti·ansaction, pi{blish~!1g facts wh1~h they were not entitled to publish, all of which frusti·atecl the sale to the defendants' damage, in excess of the amount
claimed clue ancl owing, to the defendants'
damage.
\Ve woulc1 like to file that counterclaim
and third party claim, naming those who maliciously in terfe1·ec1, and also make a demand
fo1· jury trial on the issues.'' (R. 126)

On September 10, 1964, this case was for the
sceoncl time set for pl'ef rial hea1·ing before Third
District Judge Stewart M. Hanson upon the request
of Respondents' attorney. All parties were present
at this pretrial hearing, either in pel'Son or by counsel, except defendants Security Title Company, Max
G. Frampton and Ma1·y L. Frampton, who had failed to file an answer or otherwise plead to Respondents' complaint and whose defaults had been duly
entered, (R.70), and Munay State Bank which
filed a disclaime1· in the action previous to pretrial.
( R. 71).
At the Septembe1· 10 p1·et1·ial hea1·ing, discusisons we1·e held on all issues and matters raised by
the pleadings on file in this case. Statements and
admissions we1·e made by attorneys present on all
issues before Third District Judge Stewart M. Hanson ( R. 75-90), including the amounts Respondent
P1·mlential claimec1 vvere due and owing on its pro10

missory note and deed of t1·ust ( R. 77, 78, 130), and
all amounts claimed due and owing by Appellants to
the other defendants in the case on their notes
mortgages and judgments. (R. 78-90). The priority'
of lien of Respondent's deed of trust over the claimed liens of other defendants in the case were fully
examined by Judge Hanson, including the tax lien
of the United States of America. (R. 76-90, 125).
In addition, the statutory remedy pursued by Respornlent in foreclosing its deed of trust in the manne1· provided by law for foreclosure on real property
pennitted by Sec. 57-1-23, U.C.A. 1953, was discussed and examined by Judge Hanson and counsel
p1·esent (R. 90, 126-130), as were other matter
raised by Respondents' complaint and the answer,
cotmte1·claims and crossclaims of the defendants in
rhe action, including Appellants.
Frnm the examination and the admissions and
stipulations made by attorneys present at pretrial,
.J uclge Hanson found there were no genuine issues
as to any material facts between the Appellants and
Hespondents and the other parties to the case as to
the balance due and owing to the Respondent Prudential from Appellants for principal, interest and
costs on Respondent's promissory note, and to the
amounts due and owing the Respondent Prudential from the Appellant Pay Less Builders Supply,
for taxes due Respondent under the deed of trust.
11

At pretrial counsel for Appellants did contend however that:
( 1) Respondent's deed of trust was not a
mortgage and therefore could not be foreclosed as a real estate mortgage. ( R. 125)
( 2) The attorney's fees requested by Respondents in the amount of $2,500.00 were unreasonable, and that the question should be
submitted to a jury (R. 126). (It is interesting to note that this was the first time this
question had been raised in the proceedings
and the request for jury t1·ial was made orally).
(3) The cost of Respondent's preliminary
title report iH the sum of $35.00 ivhich ivas
of fercd and accepted by the court at preb'ial
without c~1.:ception from Appellants' co11nsel,
was 11nreasonable. (R. 74, P. Ex. 3, 131).
On the grounds that there was no genuine issue
as to any material fact between Respondents and
Appellants, and that Respondents were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, the court solicited a
motion for summary judgment from counsel for
Respondents, which was made and granted.
At the pretrial heal'ing on September 10, 1964,
Appellants renewed their request for leave of the
court to file the same identical counterclaim and
thirdbarty claim that they had asked leave of court
to fife at the first pretrial hearing on July 8, 1964.
( R. 125, 126). See pagES9, 10, supra.
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The court denied Appellants' motion, stating:
"TH_E COURT: Let the record show toot this
rnotwn 'f!hade ~y defendants through their
co11nsel is demecl by the Co1irt up on the
grnnnds and for the reasons that this matter
ll'as set for July 8, 1.964, at the ho11r of 1 :30
o'clock P.M. for pretrial hearing and was
continued at the req11est of John Elwood Dennett by th~ Cour.t, O'Ver the objection of the
other parties, with the understanding that
the matters now requested by Mr. Dennett
icoulcl be done within a reasonable time." (R.
126)
The court further denied Appellants' motion on
the ground that Respondents had stipulated that
Appellants would not be precluded from filing a
separate action at a subsequent time on such daim
of Appellants (R. 130), and Respondent Prudential's attorney would accept service of summons and
complaint in such lawsuit.
Counsel fo1· Respondents at pretrial testified
ancl was cross examined by counsel fo1· Appellants
on the question of reasonableness of attorney's fees,
amounts due and owing to Respondents from Appellants, why a judicial foreclosure was filed and
othe1· matters. (R. 125-131).
From the testimony heard, admissions of counsel, and the proofs e~amined and the arguments of
counsel for the parties at pretrial, the court made
and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and its Decree of Foreclosure, which were filed on
October 26, 1964. (R. 75-90).
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On Octobe1· 27, 1964, notice of entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lait' and Decree of
Forecloseure were mailed by Respondents to the
Appellants. Appellants made no objections or motions to the co11rt to make additional findings or
to alter or amend the jlldgment or for a new trial.
On November 3, 1964, the Clerk of the District
Court for Salt Lake County issued its 01·der of Sale
ordering the She1·iff of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, to notice for sale and to sell the premises hereinabove described and to apply the proceeds of said
sale as in said judgment and decree directed. ( R.
101). The Sheriff of Salt Lake County did advertise the premises for sale as required by the laws of
the State of Utah in foreclosure of i·eal estate mortgages and scheduled said property to be sold at Sheriff's Sale on Tuesday, December 8, 1964, at the
time and place advertised. ( R. 111).
On November 25, 1964, the Appellants filed
their notice of appeal, the last day it could be filed
under the Utah Rules.

Alth011gh it does· not appear in the record, Respondent's attorney on December 7, 1.964, asked Appellants' attorney if he 1cas going to object to the
Sheriff's Sale schednled for December 8, 1.964, and
Appellants' attorney replied that he had no ob~ection
to the sale and if the sale proceeds were applied according to the Decree of Foreclosure, he 1l'01tld dismiss the appeal.
14

On Decembe1· 8, 1964, the mortgaged premises
were sold at Sheriff's Sale to the Respondent Pruclential for the total amount of Respondent's judgment, $33,079.15. (R. 120, 121, 122).
On Februai·y 2, 1965, the Sheriff's Amended
Return of Sale was filed with the Clerk of the Distl'ict Court of Salt Lake County. (R. 120-123). The
return shmvs Respondent Prudential bid the full
amount of its judgment for the mortgaged premises,
?,nd Respondents have been paid in full for their
Judgment, and that Respondents have no claim and
make no claim of a deficiency judgment against any
of the Appellants. (R. 120, 121, 122, 123).
On November 25, 1964, Appellants filed Notice
of Appeal, appealing the judgment in favor of Respondents and all judgments in favor of the crossdefencLmts as shown by the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Foreclosure in their
entirety. ( R. 100).
Upon motion of the United States of America,
which was not opposed by Appellants, this com·t by
onle1· elated February 1, 1965, dismissed Appellants' appeal from the judgment in favor of United
States of America. The motion of United States of
America in paragraph 3 recites, "according to the
District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decree in this case, the Government's tax
priority and priority to receive distribution from the
prnceeds of the sale of the property, appears to be
15

propedy founded upon Federal standards, and the refore unquestioned." (R. 115, 116).
Appellants failed to perfect their appeal from
the jnclgment in favor of the Respondent in accordance with the Utah A1tles of Civil Procedure. They
have perfected thefr appeal only after repeated motions of Respondents and at the direction and order
of this Court as foll01cs:

1. Under Rule 75 (a), URCP, Appellants' Designation of Record was to be filed on December 7,
1964 ( 10 days after Notice of Appeal was filed on
November 25, 1964). This Court, by order dated
February 1, 1965, made upon motion of Respondents, ordered Appellants to file Designation of Record on or before February 3, 1965. Appellants filed
Designations of Record on February 4, 1965 ( 59
days late). (R. 119)

2. Under Rule 75 ( d), URCP, Appellants'
Statement of Points was to be filed on December 7,
1964 (10 days after Notice of Appeal was filed
November 25, 1964). This Court by order dated
February 1, 1965, made upon mdtion of Respondents ordered Appellants to file their Statement of
Points' on or before February 3, 1965. Appellants '
Statements of Points was filed on February 4, 1965
(59 days late). (R. 118)
3. Under Rule 75(a) (1), URCP, on December 10, 1964, 15 days after Notice of Appeal was
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filed November 25, 1964, Appellants were required
to file their Certificate stating, H(a) that a transcript of evidence has been ordered from the court
reporter, or (b) that he does not intend to rely upon
said transcript." This Certifioote has never been
filed. On or about March 19, 1965, Appellants ordered the transcript from the court reporter at the insistence of this Court (approximately 99 days late).
4. Under Rule 73 (g), URCP, the Record on
Appeal was to be filed on or before January 4, 1965
( 40 days after Appellants filed Notice of Appeal
November 25, 1964). This Court, upon motion of
Respondent by order dated March 15, 1965, ordered
the i·ecord to be filed on or before March 20, 1965.
Record was actually field on March 2'2, 1965 (76
clays late).
5. Under Rule 75 (p), URCP, Appellants'
brief was due to be filed with the Clerk of this Court
on February 4, 1965 (one month after the Record on
Appeal was due to be filed). Once again this Court,
upon motion of Respondents, 'by order dated March
15, 1965, ordered Appellants to file their brief within 15 days of order (to-wit March 20, 1965). On
April 5 1965 this Court further ordered the Appel'
'
lants to file their brief by 5 o'clock P.M. on April
5, 1965. Appellants filed a typewritten brief on
Aprll 6, 1965 ( 61 days late).
6. On April 29, 1965, Appellants filed their
first printed brief (84 days late). Respondents were
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not served with copies of said brief. On May 4, 1965,
counsel for Respondents notified the Clerk of this
Court that he was not served with two copies of Appellants' brief as required by Rules 75 (p) ( 1). On
May 10, 1965, Respondents received two copies of
Appellants' printed brief (95 days late).
Appellants in the last sentence of their Statement of Facts note that there is a party in possession of the premises, consisting of a house and lot.
This is ti·ue. Appellants abandoned the p1·esmises and
permitted waste to be committed upon the premises
and the premises to deteriorate, in violation of their
deed of trust contract with Respondent. (R. 74, P.
Ex. 1). Appellants permitted windows to be broken
in the house, moisture to enter the house, floors to
warp and buckle, and a crack to develop in a wall of
the house. To prevent fmther deterioration and protect its ecurity, Respondents without any objection
from Appellants took possession and placed a tenant
in possession of the premises as authorized by its
deed of trust. (R. 74, P. Ex. 1, 129, 130). The rental agreement with said tenant provides for payment
of rent, and gives to the tenant an option to purchase
the p1·emises for the sum of $34,000 (which sum includes a real estate commission), upon the condition
that the premises are not redeemed by Appellants or
their creditors during the statutory period of redemption which expired on June 8, 1965. (R. 120123). In case of Redemption, Redemptioner is to
receive credit for rent paid.
J8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHERE A PRETRIAL CONFERENCE RESULTS
IN A DETERMINATION THAT THERE ARE NO DISPUTED QUESTIONS OF FACT, AND ALL QUESTIONS
OF LAW ARE DISPOSED OF BY THE PRETRIAL
COURT, THE COURT HAS THE INHE'RENT AUTHORITL, ON MOTION, TO ENTER ITS FINAL JUDGMENT.

Since all questions of fact were resolved at the
pretrial conference, and only three questions of law
were posed, to-wit: ( 1) Appellants' right to jury
trial on the question of reasonableness of Respondents' title report costs and attorney's fees, (2) Respondents' right to foreclose a deed of trust as
a real estate mortgage, and ( 3) Appellants'
right to file a third-party claim and counterclaim,
and these were ruled upon by the trial court adverse
to the Appellants, the case was ripe for the entry of
a summary judgment, or a judgment on the pleadmgs.
Motion for such an order can properly be made
orally, since Rule 7 ( b) ( 1) URCP requires all such
applications to the court to be on written motion,
"unless made cl11ring hearing or trial." Moreover,
pursuant to Rule 12 ( c), after the pleadings are
closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial,
any pa1'ty may move for judgment on the pleadings.
If matters outside of the pleadings are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56. Hence, regardless of what
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the motion is called which was made by counsel for
the Respondent Prudential upon conclusion of the
pretrial conference, it is apparent that nothing would
be gained by requiring that a party be forced to wait
ten days after a pretrial conference, at which all issues of law and fact had been resolved, before he
could properly bring a motion for summary judgment before the court by giving ten days notice,
whereas if the motion is considered a motion for
judgment on the pleadings it could be made orally
at pretrial and judgment could thereupon be entered.
The trial court acted p1·operly in exercising its
i·ight to rule upon the remaining questions of law
and enter its judgment accordingly. Merely because
a motion fo1· entry of judgment on the pleadings
appears to take the form of a motion for summary
judgment, it does not necessarily follow that the
motion for judgment on the pleadings is a motion
for summa1·y judgment requiring compliance by the
moving party with the notice provisions of Rule
56(c), URCP.
The gene1·al rule concerning the court's prerogative under such ci1·cumstances to summarily dispose of a case is summarized in 22 A.L.R.2d 599 at
609 as follows:
"\Vhere a pretrial conf e1·ence re~ults in a determination that there are no disputed questions of fact the case is i·ipe for the entry of
a summary judgment in accord with the undisputed facts. (Citing auth01:ity) . : . Inherent in the pretrial prncess is the nght of
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the court to dispose of questions of law and
w:1er~ there are no issues of fact, so that only
questions of law remain to be solved and these
are disposed of at a preti·ial confer~nce judgment must necessarily follow for one p~rty or
the other."
This general rule has been aG_cepted in the following cases:
In Shield v. Welch, 73 A.2d 536 (N.J. 1950),
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that where
the trial court concluded a pretrial conference that
action for a broker's commission resolved itself into
a question of law, the trial court, upon resolving
the question of law in favor of the defendant, properly entered a s11mmary jiulgment in .favor of the
defendant, even in the absence of any notice by defendant of a motion therefor.
In the case of Hinkle v. Hargens, 81 N.W.2d
888 at 889, (S.D. 1957) the Supreme Court of South
Dakota held "that if all disputed questions of fact
are eliminated at the pretrial conference, the court
has the inhe1·ent authority, on motion, to enter final
judgment."
In Kindley v. Williams, 76 N.W.2d 227 at 231,
the Supreme Court of South Dakota a:lso held that
"if a claim of a party is to be dismissed as a result
of a pretrial, the orderly procedure is by motion,
which if the facts justify, may be based upon the
pretrial record. . . . Where at pretrial admissions
and pleadings show that no issue of fact remains to
be determined, court has power to decide questions
. dgmen t"
of law and enter summary JU
.
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See also 88 C.J.S., Trials, Sec. 17(2), p. 45
which states: "If the pretrial confe1·ence progresse~
to the point of eliminating all questions of fact, the
court may give judgment according to the law on
the facts before him."
To rule otherwise would require the trial court
to ignore the stated rationale of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure which require that they "shall be
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." (Rule
1 (a), URCP).
POINT II
A COURT AT PRETRIAL MAY GO OUTSIDE OF
THE PLEADINGS TO DETERMINE IF ANY GENU·
!NE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT IS PRESENT IN DETER:\fINING IF A PARTY MOVING FOR
A SU:}D'IARY JUDGMENT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Appellants contend at pages 4 and 5 of their
brief that the judgment of the trial court should
be reversed because the provisions of Rule 56 (c)
URCP, and the interpretations of Rule 56(c) by
this Court prohibit the trial coul't from going outside the pleadings to determine if there is any genuine issue as to any material fact between the parties,
and to determine if Respondents are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Appellants' contentions are
incorrect since:
( 1) The third sentence of Rule 56 ( c) express22

ly authorizes the trial court to consider matters

other than pleadings in determining whether any
genuine issue as to any material fact exists between
the parties.

( 2) This Court has held that a trial court
under Rule 56 ( c) is authorized to go beyond the
pleadings in determining that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
See Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 10 U.2d 329, 353 P.2d 168, 170, where this
Com~t held Rule 56 ( c) permits excursions beyond
the pleadings, and if facts discovered irrefutably
disprove facts pleaded, summary judgment is appl'Opriate on motion therefor. For other Utah cases
see Frederick May (_(: Co. v. Dunn, 13 U.2d 40, 368
P.2d 266; Christensen v. Financial Service Co., 14
U.2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010, and Dupler v. Yates, 10
U.2d 251, 351P.2d624.
POINT III
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT RE'SPONDB~NTS HA VE FAILED TO PROVE BY COMPETENT
EVIDENCE THE ELEMENTS OF THEIR CAUSE OF
ACTION IS A 1.\'IERE EMPTY PLEA SINCE NO AUTHORITY AND NOTHING SPECIFIC IS CITED IN SUPPORT THEREOF.

Appellants claim Respondent's note and mortgage were not identified, offered and admitted in
evidence by the trial court. This is not true. Respond23

ent's loan documents consisting of prnmissory note,
deed of trust and title report were identified, offered and admitted in evidence as exhibits by the trial
court without objection by Appellants' counsel.
These exhibits were in the District Court Clerk's
office at the time the record was prepared, but for
some reason were inadvertently omitted. They h:ave
since been insterted in the record at the request
of Respondent's attorney. (R. 74, P. Ex. 1, 2, & 3).
Appellants further claim there is not one word
about offering or tendering these exhibits into evidence. This is not true. The exhibits show they
were offered and accepted, and the transcript
shows testimony i·egarding the priority of liens
of the parties to the foreclosure action as shown by
title report. ( R. 125). In addition, the transcript
shows testimony that Appellants had made no payments on Appellants' loan with Respondent Prudential. (R. 125, 130). Furthe1·, the transcript
shows testimony on the issue of attorney's fees and
cost of title report. (R. 127-131).
In addition to the documentary evidence, Respondent's judgment is based upon testimony appearing in the transcript, admissions and statements of counsel submitted at pretrial, and not contained in the transcript. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were made by the court upon this
evidence. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law were served upon Appellants' counsel and no
objections were made to them by Appellants' counsel, or motion filed to alter or amend the same under
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Rule 52, nor did Appellants' counsel file a motion
for a new· trial under Rule 59.
Furthermore, when a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a judgment in relation to any
subject within its jurisdiction, the presumption
arises that it had before it sufficient evidence to
authorize it to render such judgment, and that all
facts required to he proved to confer jurisdiction
were duly proved though the record is silent upon
the matter. Moreover, upon colla:teral attack every
presumption is in favor of validity of judgments of
courts of general jm·isdiction and every fact not
negatived by the record is presumed in support of
the judgment. lVarren 'l.J. Stansbury, 126 P.2d 251
a:t 253 (Okla. 1942) ; In Re Couch's Estate, 126 P.2d
994 (Okla. 1942). See also Thompson v. Short, 106
P.2d 720 at 726 (Wash. 1940), where the Supreme
Court of Washington held, affirming earlier authority, "Every fact not negatived by the record will be
presumed in aid of the judgment, and it will only be
held void when it affirmatively appears from the
record 'that the court had no jurisdiction to render
it." See also Stafford v. Dickison, 374 P.2d 665 at
671 (Hawaii 1962), and 30 Am. Jur., Judgments,
Sec. 28 et seq.
The rule was perhaps most clearly stated by the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of Welch v.
Focht, 171 P. 730 at 732 (Okla. 1918), as follows:
"There is also practical unanimity among the
authorities that a judgment of a court of gen25

e1·al jurisdiction cannot be collaterally attacked, _unl_es~ t~e recm·d affirmatively shows want
of Junsd1ct10n, and every fact not negatived
?Y the record is presumed in support of the
Judgment of a com·t of general jurisdiction,
and where the record of the com·t is silent
upon the subject, i~ must be presumed in support of the proceedmg~ that the court inquired
mto and found the existence of facts authorizing it to render the judgment which it did."
(Ci ting extensive au thol'ity)
It must also be noted that the1·e is a presumption that the judgment of the t1·ial court was correct
and every i·easonable intendment must be indulged
in favor of it; the bm·den of affirmatively showing
e1To1· is on the party complaining thereof. Palfrey·
man v. Bates c~· Rogers Construction Co., et al., 108
Utah 142, 158 P.2d 132 at 1:33; TV heat v. Denver &
R. G. TV. R. Co., 122 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932 at 935;
Burton v. Zions Coopaative Mernantile Institution,
122 Utah 360 249 P.2d 514 at 518.
It is therefore abundantly cleai· that the burden
is upon the Appellants to prove that Respondent
Prudential failed to prove the material allegations
of its complaint and this burden cannot be fulfilled
merely by a flat unsuppo1·ted allegation in their
brief.
POINT IV
THERE IS NOTHING IN SECTION 57-1-23, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS AMENDED, WHICH
WOULD REQUIRE THE BENEFICIARY WHO ELECT·
ED TO FORECLOSE A TRUST DEED IN THE MANNER
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PROVIDED BY LAW FOR THE FORECLOSURE OF A
MORTGAGE ON REAL PROPERTY, TO NOTIFY THE
CREDITOR OF SUCH ELECTION.

Appellants contend in their brief at page 6 that,
''There is no record to indicate how and when that
option was exercised prior to filing the complaint,
and if so, how the notice of that option was made
know (sic) to the Appellants," although Appellants
concede that such an option exists. There is nothing
in Section 57-1-23 which grants this choice to the
beneficiary, which requires notice of any kind prior
to the commencement of the action. Moreover, under
the Utah law governing the foreclosure of mortgages
(Sections 78-37-1 et seq, UCA 1953 as amended),
there is also no requirement of an advance notice to
a defaulting debtor of an intention to foreclose the
mo1'tgage. Commencement of the foreclosure action,
a proper service of process, and a copy of the complaint we1·e the only notice to which the Appellants
were en ti tlecl.
In addition, notice in the instant case is completely irrelevant and Appellants' contention of lack
of notice is raised for the first time on appeal. It
is obvious that Appellants are grasping for straws
and that very little is required of Respondents in
order to answer such a contention. It may, however,
be of interest to the Court to note that the power of
sale and the right to foreclose have been held to be
concurrent remedies in other jurisdictions; the creditor may proceed with either or both at the same
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time (Carpenter v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 71 Cal.
App.2d 593, 163 P.2d 73 (Dist. Gt. App.), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 84 7 ( 1945), and the institution of
one remedy does not preclude the enforcemenit of the
other. Carpenter v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., supra;
Carpenter v. Hamilton, 59 Cal. App.2d 146, 138
P.2d 353 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943); llicDonald v. Smoke
Creek Live Stock Co., 209 Cal. 231, 286 Pac. 693
( 1930). The U ta:h statute does not prohibit this
procedure. Early Utah cases held that adding the
power of sale did not in any way restrict the fore·
closure right. Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. Soidh
'Ogden Land, Bldg. & Improvement Co., 20 Utah 267,
58 Pac. 843 (1899); Dupee v. Rose, 10 Utah 305,
37 Pac. 567 ( 1894). For a thorough discussion of
the Utah Trust Deeds Act, see Note, 8 Utah Law Re.
view at 125 et seq.
POINT V
THE TRlAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING
COSTS, EXPENSES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES, SINCE
SUCH FEES ARE 'BOTH A'LLOWED UNDER UTAH
LA'W AND ARE JUST IN THE PREMISES.

Appellants in their brief at page 7 contend that
Respondent Prudential was limited in the recovery
of its fees to the provisions of Section '57-1-31,
U.C.A. 1953 as amended. However, a careful read·
ing of this section indicates that the designated li~i
tation on the payment of attorney's fees is apphcable only in the limited instance where a default·
ing debtor corrects his default prior to the comple·
tion of a sale, by power of sale, under a valid trust
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deed. This Section is obviously not applicable in the
instant case since Appellants nei1ther attempted to
correct the default nor was such recourse available
to them under the circumstances where the beneficiary elected to foreclose the trust deed as a mortgage. The award of attorney's fees for the presecution of a mortgage foreclosure in Utah is controlled
by Section 78-37-9, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, and
the trial court's action in the instant case was well
in line with statutory authorilty.
POINT VI
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO ALLOW THE .NPPELLANTS A JURY TRIAL.

Appellants' contention that their right to a jury
trial was improperly denied is ludicrous under the
facts of this case. A demand for jury trial in Uta:h
is governed by the provisions of Rule 38, URCP,
and in the complete a:bsence of any attempt by Appellants to make a written demand for a jury trial,
and to pay the statutory jury fee, they are barred
from raising this contention for the first time on
a:ppeal. See Hamilton et al. v. Salt Lake County
Sewerage Improvement District No. 1, et al., 15
U.2d 216, 390 P.2d '235; In Re Woodward, 14 U.2d
336, 384 P.2d 110; Tygesen v. Magna Water Co.,
13 U.2d 397, 375 P.2d 456; Carson v. Dougl,as, 12
U.2d 4'24, 367 P.2d 462; North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irr. Co., et al., 1'18 Utah 600, 223 P.2d
577; 5 Am. J ur.2d, Appeal and Error, Sec. 545 et
seq, pp. 29 et seq.
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Moreover, the only mention made by Appellants of a jury trial, raised during the pretrial conference, was an oral request by counsel for Appellants that the question of attorney's fees be submitted to a jury. Quite obviously, the question of entitlement to attorney's fees is not a question triable by
a jury, but is a clear and simple question of law
to be decided by the com't. This is made abundantly
clear in Sec. 78-37-9, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, which
provides in part as follows:
"In all cases of foreclosure when an attorney's
fee is claimed by the plain tiff, the amount
thereof shall be fixed by the court, any stipulation to the contrary notwithstanding; . . .
See also 37 Am. J m'., JJ nrtgages, Secs. 600, 601,
pp. 81, 82.
POINT VII

A TRUSTEE IN AN ACTION TO FORECLOSE A
DEED OF TRUST AS A l\IORTGAGE IS A PROPER
PARTY PLAINTIFF.

Section 57-1-23, U.C.A. 1953 as amended gives
a beneficiary under a deed of trust the option in
case of default to either hold a Trustee's sale under
a powe1· of sale, or to foreclose the trust deed under
the law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real
property. The statute does not state whether the
trustee or beneficiary named in the trust deed shall
bring the action to foreclose and Respondents admit
it is arguable that either or both should have the
power. The Utah Supreme Court in prior decisions
has allowed the beneficiary to bring a foreclosure
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action on the ground that the trustee could not
assert any right, interest or defense which the beneficiary, the real party in interest, could not make.
See Weir v. Bauer, 75 Utah 498, 286 Pac. 936
( 1980), Sidney Stevens Implement Co., v. South Ogden Land, Bldg. & Improvement Co., supra, Dupee
v. Rose, supra. Even though these cases hold the
beneficiary shall bring the action to foreclose, they
do not hold the trustee is not a proper party.
There are decisions from other states that hold
that where the beneficiary could not practicably
bring the action, as where the beneficiaries are too
numerous, the trustees should be allowed to bring the
foreclosm·e action. See e.g. Barkhausen v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 351 Ill. App. 388,
115 N.E.2d 640 (1953), White v. MacQueen, 360 Ill.
286, 243, 195 N.E. 832, 835 (1935).
The California Trust Deed Law which served as
a pattern for the Utah Deed of Trust Law specifically allows either the beneficiary or the trustee to
bring the foreclosure action. (Calif. Code Civ. Proc.,
Sec. 725 (a), 34 Cal. J ur. 2d 171 et seq.)
From the foregoing authorities, Respondents
contend that the trustee is not a necessary ]Xlrty
plaintiff to bring the foreclosure action; however,
the trustee is a p1'oper party pl.aintiff, and in no
event should a judgment of foreclosure be reversed
because the trustee and benficiary file the action
as co-plaintiffs.
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Security Title Company was named defendant
in Respondent's complaint because it was the assignee of judgment against the Appellants in favor
of Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co. ( R. 74 P. Ex. 3)
Said judgment constituted a lien against the mortgaged premises, which had to be cleared from the
title to the premises through foreclosure. Said judgment has been satisfied since the commencement of
the foreclosure adion and simultaneously with the
filing of this brief, Security Title Company has filed
with this Court a disclaimer, whereby it disclaimed
any interest in and to the property which is the subject matter of this foreclosure action. The contention of Appellants that Security Title Company appears both as plaintiff and ,as a defendant is therefore moot.
POINT VIII

APPELLANTS' CLAIM THAT ELLIS J. ROBINSON
AND ELIZA ANN ROBINSON AFFIXED THEIR SIG·
NATURES TO THE PROMISSORY NOTE AS ACCOM·
MODATION MAKERS WAS NOT RAISED IN THE
PLEADINGS OR AT PRETRIAL AND CANNOT BE
RAISED FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

The promissory note shows the personal en·
dorsements of Ellis J. Robinson and Eliza Ann Rob·
inson as co-makers (R. 74, P. Ex. 2), which fact
Appellants admit in the Seventh Defense in their
Answer. (R. 26, 27). No claim was made by Appellants in their pleadings or at the pretrial confer·
ence that Ellis J. Robinson and Eliza Ann Robinson
executed the promissory note as accommodation
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makel'S. Their claim cannot be brought before this
Court for the first time on appeal. (See cases cited
under Point VI supra.)
As further argument against Appellants' claim
on this point, an examination of the Sheriff's Return of Sale shows Respondent Prudential has been
paid in full for its judgment of foreclosure and that
Respondent Prudential has no deficiency judgment
against any of the Appellants. Moreover, Respondents now make no claim of deficiency judgment
against them. Therefore, the claim of Appellants
that Ellis J. Robinson and Eliza Ann Robinson have
been released from liability from Respondents' judgment because of the claimed waivers becomes a
moot question.
POINT IX
THE BURDEN OF PROVING ERROR MAY NOT
BE SHIFTED ON APPEAL FROM APPELLANT TO
RESPONDENT AND REVIEWING COURT CANNOT
BE EXPECTED TO PROSECUTE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY TO FIND REASONS FOR OR AGAINST RULINGS OF TRIAL COURT, BUT IT IS DUTY OF COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, BY CITATION OF AUTHORITIE'S AND BY ARGUMENT, TO SHOW COURT IN
WHAT MANNER RULINGS COMPLAINED OF ARE
ERRONEOUS.
1

This court speaking through then District
Judge Crockett stated in the case of Palfreyman v.
Bates & Rogel's Construction Co., et al, 108 Utah
142, 158 P.2c1132 at 133:
"We are favored with no citation of author33

ity in the .appellant's brief. This com·t does
not look with favor upon the cause of a liti.
gant who raises points and casts them in the
lap of the court for i·esea1·ch and determination, and if this is done, it is within the dis.
cretion of the court to ref use to consider
them." (Citing authorities)
See also Arnold v. Splendid Bakery, 401 P.2d 271
at 277 (Idaho 1965) ; H' illiams v. DeLay, 95 P.2d
839 (Alaska 1964); Weaver v. Sibbett, 393 P.2d
601 (Idaho 1964); Reed v. State Election Board,
369 P.2d 156 (Okla. 1962); and McDaniel v. McDaniel, 391 P.2d 191 (Wash. 1964).
CONCLUSION
It is respecfully submitted that Appellants' ap·
peal should be dismissed and the judgment of the
trial court affirmed on the ground that:

( 1) The only genuine issue between the Ap·
pellants and Respondents is attorney's fees claimed
by Respondents in their complaint and allowed by
the trial court in the sum of $2,500. Respondent
Prudential has consumated a sale of the mortgaged
premises for $34,000 upon the condition that the
Respondent's judgment and the Sheriff's sale are
affirmed by this Court. If the attorney's fees al·
lowed to the Respondent a1·e cancelled by this Court,
Respondent's judgment will be reduced to the sum
of $30,579.15, and Appellants will i·ealize the net
difference between Respondent's judgment and the
option sales price, or the sum of $3,430.85, (less a

real estate commission); despite the fact that Appellants have paid nothing on Respondent Prudential's loan.
( 2) The law applicable to each point raised
by the Appellants is against Appellants and in favor
of the Respondents;
( 3) A review of the record in this case shows
that counsel for Appellants has done everything
within his power to obstruct the orderly prosecution
of this foreclosure action in the trial court and this
Court by the filing of dilatory motions and by his
failure to abide by the rules fixed by this Court
gove1·ning appellate procedure, which all members
of the Bar a1·e bound to uphold; and
( 4) Appellants fail to cite one text or one
case authority in support of their contentions, as set
forth in their brief, to assist this Court in its determination of this Appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
EARL P. STATEN
DON A. STRINGHAM
604 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg.
315 East 2nd South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs and Respondents

35

